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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs 
RUSSELL RAY THOMPSON, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
CASE NO. 950515-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals 
in this case pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j)(1996), as this 
case was poured over to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to a letter dated June 12, 1995 from Geoffrey J. 
Butler, Clerk of the Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by 
improperly limiting testimony regarding the victim's 
aggressive and violent character. 
Standard of Review. 
A trial court's determination with regard to the 
admissibility of evidence is a conclusion of law that is 
1 
reviewed for correctness, and will not be reversed unless 
"clearly erroneous" State v. Diaz, 859 P. 2d 19, (Utah App. 
1993). However, the trial court's conclusions of law are 
accorded no deference by the reviewing court. State v. 
Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); State v. Wilcox, 808 
P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1991); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
781-82 (Utah 1991). 
2. Whether the evidence presented at trial fails to 
sustain a conviction of first degree murder in as much as 
the state failed to prove every element of the offense and 
failed to refute the self defense claim beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Standard of Review. 
In making a determination as to whether there is 
sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction, an appellate 
court is limited to insuring that there is sufficient 
competent evidence as to each element of the charge to 
enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant committed the crime. State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 
1146, 1150 (Utah 1991). 
While it is the "exclusive function of the jury to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the 
2 
evidence," State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah 
1986), a verdict may be overturned when the "evidence is so 
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not 
have reached that verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State 
v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1986) (quoting State v. 
Isaacson. 704 P.2d 555 (Utah 1985)). The reviewing court 
must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the jury verdict. State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050 (Utah 
1987) . 
3. Whether the cumulative errors occurring in this 
trial require a reversal of Mr. Thompson's conviction. 
Standard of Review. 
The doctrine of harmless error applies to "errors which, 
although properly preserved below and presented on appeal, 
are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is 
no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome 
of the proceedings." State v. Villarreal. 857 P.2d 949, 
957-58 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. Verder 770 P.2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989)), aff'd 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). For 
an error to require reversal, "the likelihood of a different 
outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in 
the verdict." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 
3 
1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND COURT RULES 
The Due Process Clause of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions are presented for interpretation, and they 
provide: 
Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part, 
Section 1. . . . [no State shall] deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law . . . 
Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
[Due Process of Law] No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law. 
The relevant statutes involved in this case include Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203, 76-2-401 and 76-2-402, which provide, 
in pertinent part: 
76-5-203. Murder. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of 
another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to 
another commits an act clearly dangerous to human 
life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life engages in 
4 
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to 
another and thereby causes the death of another; 
76-2-401. Justification as defense - When allowed. 
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution 
for any offense based on the conduct. The defense of 
justification may be claimed: 
(1) When the actor's conduct is in defense of 
persons or property under the 
circumstances described in Sections 76-2-402 
through 76-2-406 of this part; 
76-2-402. Force in defense of person - Forcible felony 
defined. 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using 
force against another when and to the extent that he or 
she reasonably believes that force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such other's 
imminent use of unlawful force. However, that person 
is justified in using force intended or likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury only if he or she 
reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent 
death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third 
person as a result of the other's imminent use of 
unlawful force, or to prevent the commission of a 
forcible felony. 
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under 
Subsection (1), the trier of fact may consider, but is 
not limited to, any of the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the danger; 
(b) the immediacy of the danger; 
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would 
result in death or serious bodily injury; 
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent 
propensities; and 
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the 
parties' relationship. 
Rules 404(a)and 404(a) (2)of the Utah Rules of Evidence are 
5 
also presented for interpretation by this Court. Such 
subsections of Rule 404 provide the following: 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a 
person's character or a trait of character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving action in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, 
except: 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent 
trait of character of the victim of the crime 
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait 
of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence 
that the victim was the first aggressor . . . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, This case comes to the Utah 
Court of Appeals from a conviction of Mr. Russell Ray 
Thompson of a first degree felony murder pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-203. Defendant/Appellant was tried before a 
jury, the Honorable Leslie Lewis presiding. The case 
involved a confrontation between the defendant/appellant and 
the decedent at the defendant/appellant's home. After an 
argument, the deceased was shot and killed. At trial, 
defendant/appellant argued his acts were justified and 
necessary to defend himself from death or serious bodily 
injury. 
B. Course of the Proceedings, Mr. Thompson was charged 
with first degree felony murder for the death of Trika 
Ballard on April 23, 1994, under U.C.A. §76-5-203. A 
three-day jury trial was held January 9 - 11, 1995. At 
trial, the defendant/appellant sought to introduce evidence 
regarding specific acts of violence by the decedent. Judge 
Lewis ruled the proposed testimony inadmissible and severely 
limited the evidence that could be introduced. On January 
7 
11, 1995, Mr. Thompson, the defendant/appellant, was found 
guilty as charged. 
On May 12, 1995, Thompson was sentenced to five years to 
life and fined $9,250.00. His notice of appeal was timely 
filed, and on August 16, 1995, this case was poured over 
from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
On December 17, 1996, this Court granted Mr. Thompson's 
motion to withdraw his prior brief and the filing of this 
new brief was permitted. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 23, 1994, Russell Ray Thompson and his 
girlfriend, Lisa Edwards, were in the company of Trika 
Ballard. The three friends had been drinking heavily and 
each had received two injections of methamphetamine that 
day. (R. 942-55). In the evening, all three went to 
Thompson's apartment, where Ballard attempted to initiate a 
sexual encounter with Edwards in the bedroom. (R. 954-55). 
While Ballard and Edwards were in the bedroom, an 
acquaintance of Thompson's, Chad Murray, arrived at the 
apartment to pick up some marijuana. (R. 955-57) . Murray 
purchased a bag of marijuana from Thompson and left. (R. 
8 
957) . 
Thompson returned to the bedroom and tried to stop 
Ballard from continuing the sexual encounter. (R. 957) . He 
told Ballard he knew she was unable to donate plasma at the 
blood center because she had AIDS. (R. 958). Ballard 
became incensed at the suggestion, and lashed out at 
Edwards and pinned her against the closet door. Thompson 
tried to separate the two women, and tried to get Ballard 
calmed down. (Id.) 
Ballard did not calm down. In fact, her behavior grew 
increasingly erratic. (R. 959-60). After the initial 
confrontation, Ballard went into the living room and phoned 
her sister, Trina Russom. Thompson got on the phone to ask 
Russom to come and get her sister because was out of 
control. (R. 960) . During this period, Ballard tore up the 
residence, broke things, uprooted plants and overturned 
furniture. She continued to grow more agitated and 
aggressive. (R. 960-64). Trina Russom was not willing to 
come and help Thompson and Edwards with her sister, Trika. 
(Id.) 
During the chaos, Thompson noticed his .44 magnum pistol 
was missing from its usual place on bedroom night stand. 
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(R. 961). He asked Ballard if she had taken the gun. They 
argued for a short time, and then she told him she would 
kill him with his own gun, and made a threatening gesture. 
(R. 961). Thompson began searching for the .44 but was not 
able to find it. He believed Ballard had taken and hidden 
the weapon. (Id.). 
While searching for the missing .44, Thompson phoned 
Ballard's sister a third time pleading for help with the 
increasingly frantic situation. He offered to pay for her 
cab, round trip, if she would just come and get her sister 
under control. (R. 964). Russom explained to Thompson that 
sometimes Ballard had to be knocked unconscious to get her 
under control. She told Thompson he should "knock her out." 
(R. 965-66). 
On Russom's advise, Thompson hit Ballard on the left 
side of the face with the .22 rifle, but it didn't phase 
her. (R. 966) With Ballard undaunted, Thompson phoned 
Russom again pleaded with her to help them with her sister. 
(Id.). 
During this call, a shot rang out from the bedroom where 
Ballard and Edwards were. Thompson leapt to the other room 
and saw Edwards holding the .22 rifle. (R. 968). Edwards 
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tossed the rifle on the bed and she and Ballard went into 
the living room. (R. 970). Thompson, still in the 
bedroom, heard Edwards say, "She's got the gun." (Id-). 
Thompson grabbed the rifle and rushed out to see what was 
happening. (R. 971) . 
Thompson saw Ballard behind the recliner chair in the 
living room with the .44 magnum. Ballard aimed the gun at 
Thompson. Believing that he was about to be shot and 
killed, Thompson fired his rifle at Ballard in self defense 
and shot her six times, killing her. (R. 973-74) 
Realizing their friend was dead, Thompson and Edwards 
panicked. They put the body in a blanket and loaded it into 
his truck. The body was then taken and left near Pioneer 
Park. (R. 980-81). With the assistance of some friends, 
Thompson and Edwards left the state and traveled to Spokane, 
Washington, where Thompson was arrested three days later. 
(R. 986-94). 
At trial, the defense sought to introduce evidence 
regarding the victim's propensity for violence to establish 
that the victim had a character trait for violence. (R. 
8 62). The defense produced witness Robert Russom, the 
decedent's brother-in-law, to testify to the victim's 
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character trait for physical domestic violence, including 
fighting. (R. 8 63). In addition, the defense produced Ivan 
Kelly Brimhall, a friend of the decedent's, to testify to 
the victim's character trait for violence and threatening 
violence. (R. 864). The trial court ruled that the 
testimony of Mr. Russom and Mr. Brimhall was inadmissable as 
it was highly prejudicial. The trial court further denied 
the defense from asking anything more than "Have you ever 
known her [Ballard] to be violent and use a weapon?" (R. 
868) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court judge erred by improperly ruling that 
evidence of the victim's propensity for violence was 
inadmissible. Rule 402(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
allows the defendant to bring into evidence a pertinent 
character trait. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(5) permits the 
trier of fact to consider the prior violent acts or violent 
propensities of an aggressor. The trier of fact was 
wrongfully prohibited from considering evidence of the 
decedent's violent character and propensity for violence. 
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Further, the prosecution's evidence at trial was 
insufficient to support a conviction of first degree murder. 
The state failed to prove the element of intent in this case 
and was further unable to refute the claim of self defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The sum of these errors prejudiced the defendant to the 
jury to such an extent that the defendant's conviction 
should be overturned. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED EVIDENCE OF THE 
VICTIM'S VIOLENT CHARACTER. 
Evidence of the victim's violent character is relevant 
to prove that the deceased may have been the aggressor. 
While character evidence is not ordinarily admissible to 
show the person acted in accordance with that character 
trait on a particular occasion, Rule 404 (a) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, (1992 as amended), an exception to this 
general rule requires the trial court to admit character 
evidence of the victim when offered to demonstrate the 
accused acted in self defense. Rule 404(a)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. This well-settled exception allows an 
13 
accused in a homicide case who defends on the grounds of 
self-defense to offer evidence of a victim's violent or 
overly aggressive character., The principal manner in which 
character evidence may be introduced is evidence of a 
specific acts of violence criminal conviction or reputation 
evidence of a victim's character. State v. Minnish, 560 
P.2d 340 (Utah 1977); State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 96 (Utah 
1982) . 
At trial, but out of the presence of the jury, a proffer 
of proof was made that the deceased had committed several 
acts of domestic violence in the past. (R. 856). Because 
Thompson's claim of self defense placed the issue of the 
deceased's character into evidence, he was entitled to prove 
the overly aggressive and violent character of the deceased, 
but the trial court did not allow such testimony. 
The trial court ruled that this evidence would not be 
admitted because of its "highly prejudicial" nature and 
concluded the defense would only be permitted to ask very 
limited and carefully phrased questions, specifically 
excluding critical testimony of prior violent behavior. (R. 
864-69). (See Addendum A for the court's discussion on this 
issue,) 
14 
Evidence of the deceased's violent and aggressive 
character nonetheless was relevant in this case to prove 
that the victim may have been the aggressor and that 
Thompson was fearful of the deceased and justified in that 
belief. Whigmore addressed this concern in his treatise on 
evidence stating: 
When the issue of self defense is made in a trial 
for homicide and thus a controversy arises whether 
the deceased was the aggressor, one's persuasion 
will be more or less affected by the character of 
the deceased; it may throw much light on the 
probabilities of the deceased's action. 
1 V. Whigmore, Evidence, § 63 (3rd ed. 1940). In the 
instant case, the defense, consistent with Whigmore, wished 
to elicit testimony regarding the aggressive and violent 
character of the deceased though the testimony of Mr. Robert 
Russom and Mr. Ivan Brimhall. Such testimony would have 
allowed the jury to acknowledge that Thompson acted 
reasonably in his use of deadly force in self defense. 
Through the testimony of Mr. Robert Russom, the defense 
attempted to show that the decedent had been violent during 
the fifteen year period preceding her death. Mr. Russom 
testified that the decedent had fought with her sister, 
Trina Russom, (R. 857), and had also fought with her 
15 
husband. (R. 863 and 870) . 
Another witness, Mr. Ivan Brimhall, also was prepared to 
testify he had seen the decedent physically attack her 
sister. (R. 859 and 878). He described how he saw the 
decedent violently attack her sister and threaten to kill 
her. (Id.). 
When the jury returned, the trial court limited 
counsel's questioning of the decedent's character for 
violence to the following two questions: 
1. Have you ever seen her behave in an aggressive or 
violent manner? 
2. Have you ever known her to be violent and use a 
weapon? (R. 866). 
In order to properly establish the decedent's character 
and reputation for danger, violence and aggressiveness, the 
defense should have been able to ask the witnesses more 
specific questions, such as: 
1. Have you ever observed the deceased exhibit 
violence that endangered others? 
2. Have you ever observed the deceased behave overly 
aggressive and exhibit deadly violence? 
3. Have those occasions you have observed the 
deceased exhibit violence in a domestic setting? 
4. Have you ever observed the deceased exhibit 
violence while she was under the influence of drugs 
or alcohol? 
This line of questioning would have produced testimony 
16 
showing the deceased had a known history and reputation for 
violence and the jury could therefore infer that the use of 
deadly force in self defense was justified. This crucial 
testimony would have given support to the defendant's 
testimony at trial that, in the midst of a crisis, deadly 
force was necessary to save his life and even possibly the 
life of Thompson's girlfriend, Ms. Edwards. Instead, the 
trial court merely allowed a general question of whether Mr. 
Russom or Mr. Brimhall had ever seen the victim behave in an 
aggressive or violent manner. 
Decisions based on similar rules of evidence support the 
defense's contention before the trial court that the 
proposed line of questioning was proper. 
In People v. Florey, 505 N.E.2d 1096 (111. 1987), the 
trial court was found to have erred when it to refuse to 
admit evidence of the victim's reputation for violence, as 
well as evidence of violent acts and threats of the victim 
on a specific occasion, even though the conduct was directed 
toward third persons. 
Also, in State v. Daniels, 465 N.W.2d 633 (Wis. 1991), 
the circuit court was found to have abused its discretion by 
ruling in an attempted murder case that the defendant, while 
17 
acting in self defense with a dangerous weapon, could not 
prove his fearful state of mind by evidence other than his 
own knowledge of the victim's prior violent acts. 
Similarly, the trial court in Mr. Thompson's case abused 
its discretion by prohibiting evidence of the deceased's 
reputation for violence with accounts of her widely known 
violent history. Whether the deceased ever behaved in an 
aggressive or violent manner was too general of a question 
to produce any meaningful testimony. Further, state statute 
specifically provides for evidence of past violent acts to 
be considered by the trier of fact when a claim of self 
defense is offered: 
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under 
Subsection (1), the trier of fact may consider, but is 
not limited to, any of the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the danger; 
(b) the immediacy of the danger; 
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would 
result in death or serious bodily injury; 
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent 
propensities; and 
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the 
parties' relationship. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(5) (1994)(emphasis added). 
According to the above statute, admitting evidence of 
the decedent's prior violent acts or violent propensities is 
18 
proper in a case such as this. By ruling the specific 
questions designed to produce relevant, probative evidence, 
the trial court prohibited the defense from advancing its 
case to the jury. The defense is entitled to have its 
theory of the case put to the jury if there "is any basis in 
the evidence to support that theory." State v. Brown, 607 
P.2d 261 (Utah 1980) . 
Evidence to support that theory existed in the testimony 
of Mr. Russom and Mr. Brimhall. By ruling the evidence of 
the decedent's violent past inadmissible, the trial court 
committed reversible error as it prevented Mr. Thompson from 
adequately defending himself by fully presenting his theory 
of the case. 
The jury was wrongly denied highly probative, relevant 
evidence of the violent propensities of the decedent, and 
the was not provided sufficient information to adequately 
weigh the evidence in determining the reasonableness of Mr. 
Thompson's response. The prohibited testimony would have 
allowed the defense to advance its theory of the case and to 
provided the jury with the important evidence that by itself 
could reasonably support an acquittal. 
19 
II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN A CONVICTION. 
A. The State Failed to Prove Every Element of 
the Offense. 
Because the jury has the exclusive function of 
determining the credibility of the witnesses and weighing 
the evidence, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 
on appeal, the evidence must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 
892, 893 (Utah 1986) . However, this standard cannot 
conceal gaps in the evidence. "A fundamental precept of our 
criminal law is that the State must prove all elements of a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 
88, 92 (Utah 1981); State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 
1983). The Due Process Clause of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions protect the accused against conviction except 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary 
to constitute the crime with which he is charged. Starks, 
supra.; In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 
1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970) . 
The evidence in this case is insufficient to support Mr. 
Thompson's conviction because the state failed to prove the 
requisite intent under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. The 
20 
evidence produced at trial does not establish Thompson acted 
intentionally or knowingly, but rather the evidence supports 
the inference that he acted reflexively and without the 
opportunity to form the requisite intent under the statute. 
Intent is "an element that often can be proved only by 
means of circumstantial proof." Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 504 
(Utah 1986) . Indeed, recent decisions have shown certain 
circumstances are sufficient to prove the defendant's 
intent. See, e.g. State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 
1986) (evidence sufficient to show intent to retain and 
receive stolen property); Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 504-05 (Utah 
1896) (evidence sufficient to prove intent to kill in 
attempted murder case); Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555, 557-58 (Utah 
1985) (sufficient evidence to uphold conviction for 
aggravated burglary); State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359 (Utah 
1983) (evidence, including identifications by victim and 
neighbor, sustain conviction of burglary and aggravated 
assault). 
Unlike in these cases, the state failed to show any 
significant circumstance to support the finding of requisite 
intent beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution had to 
prove that at the time of the shooting, Thompson had the 
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intent to cause the death of Ballard, or that he knowingly 
caused her death. 
The prosecution offered no meaningful theory consistent 
to support such a finding. Even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, the evidence falls far short 
establishing intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Instead of providing evidence of intent, the state 
argued that Ballard had become a "pest in the house" (the 
prosecution's words) (R. 1082), and because of this 
prosecution theory supposedly Thompson had the motive to 
kill his friend. However, motive is not the equivalent of 
intent. 
The state also argued that because Ballard had been shot 
six times, this evidenced Thompson's intent to kill her. 
However, evidence supports the defense's contention that 
Thompson was experienced with both his .22 rifle and the .44 
magnum and was well aware of their relative power. (R. 
7 94). Under the circumstances, it was reasonable to fire 
multiple shots in order to defend himself against an 
aggressor with a much more dangerous weapon. 
Because it failed to produce any evidence to show that 
Thompson had the capacity to form the requisite intent, the 
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state could only point to Thompson's conduct after the 
shooting. However, like motive, evidence of flight or 
concealment of a crime cannot substitute for intent. While 
it is often used by the prosecution to supply evidence of 
guilt, evidence of flight or concealment of a crime should 
not be equated with an admission of guilt. State v. Bales, 
675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983) . Further, the Utah Supreme 
Court has stated the inference of guilt may not be used to 
establish the defendant's intent before the act was 
committed. Id. 
In State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), the 
Supreme Court specifically stated that evidence of an 
accused's acts after the commission of a crime may not be 
used by the prosection to establish the requisite mens rea 
of a crime. In Bolsinger, a woman had died during sexual 
intercourse with the defendant, and the defendant confessed 
to strangling her to heighten her orgasm. After realizing 
she had died, the defendant tried to disguise what had 
occurred by covering the decedent's body with a sheet and 
tearing up her apartment to make it appear as if a murder-
rape-burglary had taken place. The court reversed the 
conviction of murder in the second degree, and suggested the 
23 
evidence of concealment so offended the jury that they 
convicted the defendant without sufficient evidence to 
establish intent: 
The evidence here simply does not support a 
finding of depravity in the conduct of the defendant 
that caused the death of [decedent]. The jury may well 
have been swayed by the reprehensible conduct of the 
defendant subsequent to her death. But that conduct is 
not before us for review. The evidence is undisputed 
that [decedent] was dead when defendant rose from the 
bed. He himself covered her face with a sheet, a 
universal gesture acknowledging death. At that moment 
the conduct which subjected him to a charge of 
criminal homicide came to an end. 
Id. at 1221(emphasis added). 
Similarly, in the instant case, the state failed to meet 
its burden on the element of intent and instead relied on 
evidence of motive and the horrific details of the 
concealment of the crime as improper substitutes. 
Because the prosecution failed to prove every element of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. Thompson's 
conviction must be overturned. 
B. Evidence Refuting Self Defense Was So Lacking 
and Insubstantial That a Jury Could Not Have 
Reached a Guilty Verdict Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt. 
Besides proving every element of the offense, the state 
must also have proven beyond a reasonable doubt the absence 
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of self defense. It is not the defendant's burden to 
"establish a defense of self defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, or even by a preponderance of the evidence." State 
v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, at 214 (Utah 1985). The jury may 
acquit even though the evidence of self defense falls "far 
short of establishing the justification or excuse by a 
preponderance of the evidence upon the subject." State v. 
Jackson, 528 P.2d 145, 147 (1974). 
In sum, when there is a basis in the evidence, whether 
the evidence is produced by the prosecution or by the 
defendant, which would provide some reasonable basis for the 
jury to conclude that a killing was done to protect the 
defendant from an imminent threat of death by another, the 
prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the killing was not in self defense. Starks, 
supra at 92. 
At trial, evidence was produced by Thompson's own 
testimony, that he had acted in response to Ballard 
threatening to shoot him with a .44 magnum. (R. 42). The 
prosecution's only attempt to refute the claim of self 
defense was to state in closing arguments, the following: 
I'd suggest to you the evidence also shows he was not 
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justified in [shooting Ballard], because there was no 
reason for him to be afraid. That any reasonable person 
placed in his circumstances, would not have been afraid 
of Trika Ballard. That any reasonable person under 
those circumstances would have waited until she calmed 
down, would have called the police, would have had her 
leave with Chad when Chad came, would have done any of a 
number of other things, other than shoot her. (R. 1085). 
Such speculation offered by the prosecution does not 
satisfy the state's burden to refute the claim of self 
defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the state failed 
to meet its burden to show the killing was not in self 
defense, the conviction must be overturned. 
III. THE COMBINATION OF ERRORS PREVENTED THE DEFENDANT 
FROM RECEIVING A FAIR TRIAL. 
Not Harmless Error. The combination of these errors 
warrants overturning the jury's verdict. No reasonable 
jury, absent these errors, could find that Mr. Thompson 
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Trika 
Ballard, without the justification of self defense. 
The doctrine of harmless error applies to "errors which, 
although properly preserved below and presented on appeal, 
are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is 
no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome 
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of the proceedings." State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 
957-58 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989)), afffd 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). For 
an error to require reversal, "the likelihood of a different 
outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in 
the verdict." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 
1987). 
In determining whether reversal is warranted, several 
factors are considered, including "the importance of the 
witnesses] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the 
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of 
evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the 
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination 
otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of 
the prosecution's case." State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 
205 (Utah 1987). 
Here, the most important eye-witness testimony was that 
of Mr. Thompson. Thompson never denied he shot Ballard, but 
rather offered a reasonable justification for his conduct. 
This justification was never refuted by cross-examination, 
material contradictions by other witnesses or physical 
evidence. The sum of the prosecution's case was that 
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Thompson was not reasonable in his response to a life-
threatening situation. 
In this case, the likelihood of a different outcome at a 
fair trial is extremely high. In a fair trial, the jury 
would not be prejudiced against the defendant and would 
receive evidence of the decedent's character, reputation and 
the reasonableness of certain actions in self-defense. In a 
fair trial, the defendant's constitutional right to Due 
Process guaranteed by the United States and Utah 
Constitutions would be preserved by requiring the 
prosecution to prove each and every element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt and further requiring the 
prosecution to refute the claim of self defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Indeed, the likelihood of a different outcome is 
sufficiently high in this case to warrant disturbing the 
jury verdict and these errors should not be considered 
harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons Mr. Thompson 
respectfully requests that relief be granted and that his 
conviction is reversed and the case remanded to the district 
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court for an order of dismissal or the scheduling of a new 
trial. 
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character trait. 
THE COURT: Let me get counsel to approach. 
(Side bar conference.) 
THE COURT: Sir, you may step out, if you 
would, for a moment. Please don't discuss your testimony 
with anyone else. 
If I could look at the rule, Mr. Mack, and then 
I'll let you make your argument fully on the record. 
Thank you. 
MR. MACK: Your Honor, through the two 
witnesses that we have had some discussion with, Bob 
Russom and Kelly Brimhall, it's our desire to have them 
testify with respect to their opinions that they have 
regarding a character trait of the victim under Rule 404, 
rule of evidence 404-A-2. 
Specifically they have both- - I don't know if 
we got that far with Mr. Brimhall, but they each, at 
least, indicated to the court that they were aware of at 
least one instance of violence that they had observed, 
threatening behavior or violence, on the part of Trika 
Ballard. And we would ask that that be allowed to be 
admitted, subject to the rule. 
We're offering it to show that she could have 
been the aggressor in this case, and that Mr. Thompson, 
and I think we, at some point, are going to need to show 
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reasonable apprehension on his part for the use of deadly 
force. And I think that bolsters that, allows us to get# 
to overcome that hurdle showing that she, indeed, was 
capable, at least, of violent behavior. 
THE COURT: Do you want to speak to that, 
Mr. Blaylock? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Two things. If this is offered 
for the purpose of telling the jury this is a violent 
person, then it's inappropriate. Because two instances, 
four years old, under circumstances that are entirely 
divorced from the kind of circumstances we're talking 
about—we're talking about circumstances that involve 
family members—and under one circumstance, the witness 
indicated something about her husband or boyfriend was the 
individual with whom she was fighting. I would suggest 
that those circumstances are entirely different than the 
kind of circumstances we're talking about here. 
If we're talking about trigger mechanisms for 
anger and violence, those trigger mechanisms are not 
present in this case. For that reason I would indicate 
that it's not relevant, and it's not probative. 
And the purpose it would be offered for would 
be to color the jury's attitude of this individual, who is 
not here to speak for herself. 
THE COURT: Well, let me say this. Rule 404 
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provides evidence of a person's character, or a trait of 
character, is not admissible for the purpose of proving 
action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, 
except, and in subsection 2, it talks about evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime 
offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of 
the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case 
to rebut evidence. 
Well, this isn't evidence of peacefulness of 
the victim. This would be evidence of violence. And you 
would be offering, as I understand it, Mr. Mack, to prove 
that she acted in conformity with that on a particular 
occasion; is that correct? 
MR. MACK: That is correct. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, the only thing 
that could be deemed being in conformity, is not general 
argumentativeness, or general throwing of things. Your 
contention is that she was violent in the use of a weapon. 
You can ask these witnesses that if they knew her to have 
a reputation for violence in connection with use of a 
weapon. That, it seems to me, falls within 404. 
General reputation for arguing, fighting, 
throwing things, is not really what's relevant here. 
That's not what you're attempting to establish, is it? 
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MR. MACK: Well, Your Honor, I guess we view, 
we define violence differently. I don't think it's 
necessarily restricted to the fact whether or not she ever 
used a weapon. 
THE COURT: No, it is not. Violence is not 
restricted in that way. But if you are looking at 
establishing action in conformity with your theory on a 
particular occasion, you're not talking about simple 
general aggressive tendencies. You're talking about 
aggressive tendencies with a weapon. And I will allow 
that. I will not allow anything more generic. 
MR. MACK: Okay. Well, I don't think I can ask 
that question of these people. I don't think that's 
there. Whether she was violent with a weapon. I mean I 
don't know the answer to that, but I don't think it's 
there. And I wouldn't ask them that question, if that's 
all I can ask them with respect to her character, in the 
context of what we're talking about. 
THE COURT: How is it appropriate for me to let 
you bring in character evidence of her general 
aggressiveness, which is really what you're seeking to 
bring in- -
MR. MACK: Your Honor, I think ultimately we 
have to show reasonable fear on the part of Mr. Thompson, 
that his life, or Lisa Edwards' life was in jeopardy 
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because of all the circumstances that existed, because of 
the behavior of Trika Ballard, And I think that offering, 
having people testify who knew her and who saw her behave 
in an aggressive and violent way makes that claim. It 
bolsters that. It shows that yeah, she is capable of 
being the aggressor. 
THE COURT: I'm going to let you ask the 
question, "Have you ever seen her behave in an aggressive 
or violent manner?" And I am going to let Mr. Blaylock 
follow up in any way he deems appropriate, including 
asking the question, "Have you ever known her to be 
violent and use a weapon?" And he can also get into what 
the basis of their opinion is. 
I'm doing this because I know how the Court of 
Appeals and Supreme Court operate. I think if I were 
reading the rules strictly, I would not allow it. I'm 
going to allow it. And it's limited in that way, and you 
can tell the one witness, tell both of them that they are 
to listen carefully to the questions. 
I don't want to get into this business about 
the child and her children being taken from her. That is 
not relevant. It's highly prejudicial, and I further do 
not want to get into acts of domestic violence with any 
specificity. You can ask if those acts of domestic 
violence involved her spouse or her live-in boyfriend, and 
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if they involved any weapons. 
Also, I'm not allowing them to talk about 
hearsay. 
MR. MACK: Okay. 
THE COURT: You need to establish what the 
basis of their knowledge is, and if it isn't first-hand 
knowledge, it's not coming in. 
MR. MACK: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right, let's proceed. Bring 
the jury back in, please. Let's put the last witness on 
again. 
MR. MACK: Could we hear the question? I'm not 
sure if I asked him in front of the jury the magic 
question, here. 
THE COURT: As soon as we get the jury in we'll 
have Cecilee read that back. 
(The jury entered the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, did anyone 
hear anything or discuss the case while we were in recess 
just now? No hands are raised. 
Mr. Thompson, you're still under oath, and if 
you would retake the stand. Before anything is asked any 
further, I'm going to have the court reporter read back 
the last question. 
(WHEREUPON the pending question was read by the 
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